Whither/Wither Alimony? by Carbone, June & Cahn, Naomi R.
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 
2015 
Whither/Wither Alimony? 
June Carbone 
Naomi R. Cahn 
George Washington University Law School, ncahn@law.gwu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, p. 925, 2015 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu. 
  
Book Reviews 
Whither/Wither Alimony? 
THE MARRIAGE BUYOUT: THE TROUBLED TRAJECTORY OF U.S. ALIMONY 
LAW.  By Cynthia Lee Starnes.  New York, New York: NYU Press, 
2014.  235 pages.  $45.00. 
June Carbone* & Naomi Cahn** 
Introduction 
Kristen and Derek divorce after ten years of marriage.1  At the time of 
the divorce, Derek makes $120,000 per year and Kristen works part-time, 
earning $22,000 per year.  Kristen has degrees in nursing and dance, but she 
quit working to care for the couple’s two children and had only recently gone 
back to work part-time.  Should she be entitled to alimony?  Should it matter 
that she left Derek after she discovered that he was having an affair, even 
though he told her that the affair was over and he wanted to stay married?  
Greg and Sharon have also been married for about ten years.  Sharon is 
a teacher and the artistic director of a Brooklyn dance company.2  Greg is an 
actor.  After their son was born, Greg’s acting jobs dried up.  Sharon 
increased her hours, effectively working two jobs to keep them afloat.  To 
save money, Greg took care of the boy rather than send him to day care and 
has been a stay-at-home dad for the last five years.  Sharon’s income is about 
$120,000 per year.  If they were to part, should Greg be entitled to alimony?  
Would it matter if Sharon left Greg because she felt that they no longer had 
anything in common and Greg is devastated by the divorce? 
Marriages like these may be over.  The question is whether, in the 
context of such relationships and subsequent divorce proceedings, alimony 
can be saved.  This is the issue that Cynthia Starnes addresses in The 
Marriage Buyout: The Troubled Trajectory of U.S. Alimony Law.3  Starnes 
argues that whatever else has changed about marriage, the one thing that 
 
 *    Robina Chair of Law, Science and Technology, University of Minnesota Law School. 
 **  Harold H. Greene Chair, George Washington University Law School. 
1. Kristen and Derek are based on the parties in Berger v. Berger, 747 N.W.2d 336, 351 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2008). 
2. Greg and Sharon are loosely based on Susan Gregory Thomas, When the Wife Has a Fatter 
Paycheck: Female Breadwinners Can Make for Frustrated Husbands—Unless the Man Holds His 
Own with Income, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000087239 
6390444873204577537161203859878, archived at http://perma.cc/4WPS-EVKT. 
3. CYNTHIA LEE STARNES, THE MARRIAGE BUYOUT: THE TROUBLED TRAJECTORY OF U.S. 
ALIMONY LAW 4–6 (2014). 
926 Texas Law Review [Vol. 93:925 
 
hasn’t is the impact of caretaking on income.  She observes that in 2011, over 
40% of women with a child under six were not in the paid labor market4 and 
workers who take time off experience a significant lifelong drop in income.5  
The Marriage Buyout suggests that in an era of no-fault divorce and greater 
female independence (if not equality), marriage should be understood as a 
partnership, and it should address the possibility of dissolution the same way 
other partnerships do.  Business entities often provide that where remaining 
parties wish to continue what had been the partners’ joint undertaking, they 
arrange for a “buyout.”6  That is, to the extent the partnership holds title to 
the enterprise’s accumulated capital and ongoing income stream, the party 
continuing the business must buy out the other.  In a similar fashion, Starnes 
suggests that when one spouse leaves the relationship with an earnings stream 
accumulated over the course of a marriage, the other spouse should be 
credited with contribution to that earnings stream, and the party who “keeps” 
the higher income must buy out the other.7  The analogy to partnership law 
is evocative.  She emphasizes that married parties are engaged in a joint 
enterprise8 and that the modern employment literature shows that an “ideal 
worker,” who has a supportive spouse, earns more than a similarly situated 
worker who does not.9  Marriage is thus about gains as well as losses, and 
absent some type of an accounting at divorce, one party may keep a 
disproportionate share of the gains while the other party is accorded most of 
the losses.10 
The book, which builds on two decades of her past scholarship, ends 
with detailed proposals for alimony guidelines.11  Unlike child support or 
most state property approaches,12 alimony remains subject to a great degree 
of judicial discretion, discretion that has largely been used to scale back 
awards.13  Starnes’s proposals draw on the history of alimony, its historic 
 
4. Id. at 54. 
5. Id. at 22–23. 
6. See, e.g., UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 701, 9C U.L.A. 175 (1997).  The Uniform Partnership Act has 
been adopted by more than half of the states, including Delaware. Legislative Fact Sheet—
Partnership Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION (2014), http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFact 
Sheet.aspx?title=Partnership%20Act%20%281997%29%20%28Last%20Amended%202013%29, 
archived at http://perma.cc/H6V5-ZAAS. 
7. STARNES, supra note 3, at 156. 
8. Id. at 155. 
9. See id. at 131, 138–39 (describing the “gain theory” principle that having a supportive spouse 
allows the working spouse to dedicate less time to household duties and more time to earnings). 
10. Id. at 130. 
11. Id. at 161–68. 
12. Starnes discusses the Indiana statute presuming an equal property division.  Id. at 42–43.  
For a discussion of the move away from discretionary standards, see generally Katharine K. Baker, 
Homogenous Rules for Heterogeneous Families: The Standardization of Family Law When There 
Is No Standard Family, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 319. 
13. See STARNES, supra note 3, at 40–42, 69–73 (reporting that this broad discretion often 
hinges on the claimant’s need for alimony). 
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justifications and contradictions, and contemporary realities to make the best 
possible case for its continuation and to link the rationale she advances to a 
detailed framework for implementation. 
The case Starnes makes is the most convincing case that can be made 
for the retention of alimony awards at divorce, and we admire her advocacy.  
Is her case enough?  We are not entirely persuaded, in part, because the 
invocation of partnership law obscures as well as illuminates. 
At its core, Starnes’s partnership proposal is contractual.  That is, it rests 
on the spouses’ presumed consent to partnership principles at the time of the 
nuptials.  The partnership notion sounds reasonable.  It describes marriage as 
“a mutual commitment to pool labor, time, and talent in the expectation that 
these contributions will generate shared value in the form of income and a 
family home.”14  Yet, applying this definition to Greg and Sharon, the couple 
we described at the beginning of this Review, raises as many, if not more, 
questions than the ones it is intended to resolve.  When Greg and Sharon 
married, they may well have assumed that they would “pool labor, time, and 
talent.”  And, if they are like many young couples today, at the time they 
married they both had jobs, expected to stay employed, and assumed that 
each spouse would work in accordance with the family’s needs.  That 
changed when Greg lost his job and could not quickly find another one, 
something neither anticipated at the time of the marriage.  If fifteen years 
later Greg has still not returned to paid employment, can we still say that he 
has “pooled his labor, time, and talent” in support of the marital enterprise?  
Or has he breached his promise to do so?  Starnes’s assertion, that the 
commitment to pool resources defines the marital partnership, avoids several 
important questions. 
First, in an era in which almost all employment has become less secure 
and wages have stagnated for much of the population, does marriage today 
rest on dual-earner families?  We believe that it is entirely plausible that most 
couples today enter marriage believing that neither will or should assume a 
full-time caretaking role and that even if a spouse does, he or she must be 
prepared to resume paid employment in fairly short order in accordance with 
the family’s needs. 
Second, to the extent that a spouse does leave the labor market because 
of illness, involuntary unemployment, or a decision to concentrate more time 
and attention on the children, when do the consequences become the 
responsibility of the other spouse?  Starnes assumes that disparities in income 
arise largely because of the advantages the higher earning spouse enjoys 
through the contributions of the other spouse, but in many cases the 
disparities arise because of misfortune.  The promise to remain married is a 
promise to share not only gains but losses.  Do Starnes’s buyout proposals 
 
14. Id. at 156. 
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extend to disparities caused by misfortunes that may be random or 
unpredictable? 
Finally, can we say that any single model describes the majority of 
American marriages?  As we have documented elsewhere, American couples 
may not necessarily share the same assumptions about what will happen to 
their families.  For the upper ten percent or so of the public, evidence points 
toward a neotraditional path,15 in which marriage precedes childbearing, 
husbands continue to earn more than wives, and wives are more likely to cut 
back on work hours in the interest of the children.  For the middle and the 
bottom, public sentiment is moving in the opposite direction, with growing 
distrust of marriage and a majority of births outside of marriage.16  Male 
employment is more unstable outside the elite, and in these groups wives are 
more likely to out earn husbands at some point in the marriage; yet, this group 
also remains more committed to a traditionally gendered division of family 
responsibilities.  Do Starnes’s proposals span the class divide?  We suspect 
that the answer is no.  Alimony, both in Starnes’s book and elsewhere, 
remains associated with a traditional division of family responsibilities that 
no longer describes the majority of American marriages dependent on two 
incomes or the increasing complexity of family arrangements in a time of 
economic insecurity.17 
In this Review, we will explore Starnes’s book, assess the current state 
of American marriages, and propose separating the developments at the top 
from those affecting everyone else.  This Review highlights the book’s 
strengths in developing a sophisticated and insightful perspective on alimony 
and a persuasive justification for ongoing payments after divorce, even as it 
questions the meaning of the caretaker role in today’s families. 
I. Justifying Alimony 
Starnes considers the history of alimony, primarily to reject it in 
providing an adequate basis for alimony today—and for good reason.  The 
 
15. See JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS 
REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY 19 (2014) (stating that the prosperous and highly educated have 
“reembraced marriage”). 
16. See id. at 16–19 (showing that the least educated are far more likely to divorce within ten 
years and have children outside of marriage). 
17. Moreover, in a society where the majority of American households no longer consist of 
marital partners, alimony—which was never awarded in most divorces anyway—is increasingly 
less relevant.  See GORDON H. LESTER, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-
173, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1989, at 13 (1991) (showing that alimony was awarded to 
only 15.5% of the over 20 million women who in 1990 were currently separated or had ever been 
divorced); JONATHAN VESPA ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P20-570, 
AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2012, at 3 (2013) (reporting that of 115 
million households in the United States only 56 million were married-couple households); Lyudmila 
Workman, Alimony Demographics, 20 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 109, 109 (2012) (“[A]ccording 
to Census Bureau data, from 1887 to 1906, alimony was awarded in 9.3% of all cases.  During the 
next twenty years, its frequency increased somewhat to 15.4% in 1916 and 14.7% in 1922.”). 
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history of alimony is deeply rooted in the inferior status of women, and even 
considering its role in protecting vulnerable women, it has been the subject 
of claims of incoherence in every generation.18  Indeed, in 1880, Frederic 
William Maitland commented: “The law of Husband and Wife is in an awful 
mess (I don’t think that a layman would readily believe how bad it is) . . . .”19  
More than a century later, the American Law Institute’s Principles of the 
Family Dissolution would introduce the project by again referring to “the 
current disarray in family law.”20 
The sources of the disarray, at least as it applies to alimony, are 
threefold.  The first problem is the nature of the divorce proceeding itself.  
Legal coherence comes from judicial resolution of lawsuits through a focus 
on one cause of action at a time.  If, for a given claim, the plaintiff prevails, 
the courts tailor a remedy designed to address the precise wrong inflicted.  If 
Kristen, for example, brought a breach of contract action against Derek 
because of his adultery, the measure of damages would be tied to the harm 
his infidelity inflicted on her.21  Divorce actions, however, are not so pristine.  
They more closely resemble the distribution of an estate because of death or 
bankruptcy, a corporate reorganization, or, as Starnes argues, a partnership 
dissolution.22  These actions are necessarily different because they do not 
address one legal claim at a time.  Instead, they combine a number of 
potentially conflicting assertions in a single proceeding that unwinds the 
entangled finances of former intimates, with the financial issues relating not 
just to the partners but to their children.  In doing so, the courts are necessarily 
limited by the parties’ income and assets, as they attempt to leave both ex-
spouses with a post-divorce financial foundation.23  Precision inevitably 
suffers. 
 
18. For a modern example, see Ira Mark Ellman and Sanford L. Braver, Lay Intuitions About 
Family Obligations: The Case of Alimony, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 209, 211–12 (2012) 
(questioning the role of law in the emotional realm of family). 
19. Mary Moers Wenig, The Marital Property Law of Connecticut: Past, Present and Future, 
1990 WIS. L. REV. 807, 808 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
20. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword to AM. LAW INST., THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, at xiii (Proposed Final Draft 1997). 
21. See June Carbone, Economics, Feminism, and the Reinvention of Alimony: A Reply to Ira 
Ellman, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1463, 1472–76 (1990) (considering how expectation damages for a 
breach of contract claim are victim oriented and only consider the nonbreaching party’s loss by 
imposing that loss on the wrongdoer). 
22. STARNES, supra note 3, at 154–55. 
23. As Carbone has argued previously: 
In family dissolutions, the financial awards proceed as though the court combined all 
of the distributable assets, and all of the claims against them into a large pot and stirred.  
The resulting portions need bear no necessary relationship to any single theory of 
distribution. . . .  The goal is not to do justice in the precise sense of vindicating any 
particular claim, but to put family members in a position to untangle their comingled 
affairs and move on. 
June Carbone, The Futility of Coherence: The ALI’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 
Compensatory Spousal Payments, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 43, 43–44 (2002). 
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The second factor that contributes to the disarray is the relationship 
between the purpose of alimony and the status of women.  The justification 
for alimony has been debated in every era, but in almost every era that debate 
has intermingled claims of property ownership with discussion of the 
vulnerabilities associated with women and childbearing.  As the status of 
women changes, so do the assumptions that underlie the debate, sometimes 
in subtle ways. 
The historically dependent status of women and their presumed capacity 
for financial management informed the assumptions underlying alimony.  
Women were not just considered vulnerable because of their assumption of 
the caretaking role, they were considered vulnerable because of the fact of 
the marriage itself.24  Women, who needed to marry to raise children, were 
expected to be virgins at the altar; a marriage followed by a divorce made a 
woman damaged goods and not just because divorce itself carried a 
considerable stigma.25  As a result, marriage was expected to last a lifetime 
and it generally did.  Divorce was rare, and some states, such as New York, 
only recognized divorce a mensa et thoro (from bed and board), in effect, a 
legal separation in which neither party could remarry.26  Since the marriage 
continued, there was no property division, and the husband, who in 
accordance with the law of coverture administered the parties’ combined 
assets, kept all of the property, including the wife’s separate property.27  And 
since the marriage continued, the husband owed the wife continued support.28  
Alimony in this context constituted specific performance of the continued 
duties of the marriage.  The radical part of the determination lay in the courts’ 
willingness to specify an amount, and this reflected, in part, the husband’s 
fault.  If he had not acted egregiously enough to justify the separation, he 
would still have had to support his wife, but the courts typically deferred to 
the husband’s view of what level of support was appropriate.29 
Yet even historically, questions about the amount of alimony reflected 
an underlying disagreement as to whether alimony was just support or 
 
24. STARNES, supra note 3, at 33. 
25. Indeed, over the first half of the nineteenth century, the shotgun marriage declined 
precipitously.  See JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN 
FAMILY LAW 90–96 (2000) (indicating that both African-American and white shotgun-wedding 
rates fell before or as abortion was legalized). 
26. Rhonda Wasserman, Parents, Partners, and Personal Jurisdiction, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 
813, 828–29; Starling Thomas Morris, Comment, Full Faith and Credit in the Enforcement of 
Alimony Decrees, 24 TEXAS L. REV. 491, 491 (1946). 
27. STARNES, supra note 3, at 33; see also Chester G. Vernier & John B. Hurlbut, The 
Historical Background of Alimony Law and Its Present Statutory Structure, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 197, 198–99 (1939) (describing that a husband retained control over all property and was 
required to only pay a permanent alimony after a divorce a mensa et thoro). 
28. STARNES, supra note 3, at 33. 
29. See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Neb. 1953) (“The living standards of 
a family are a matter of concern to the household, and not for the courts to determine . . . .”). 
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concerned notions of property ownership.  In 1843, for example, in the 
context of an alimony award that exceeded the combined salaries of the 
chancellor, the secretary of state, the attorney general, and the comptroller,30 
the highest court in New York debated whether alimony should be 
understood as maintenance for a wife who could not be expected to earn 
enough to support herself or her just share of a grand estate that included the 
property she brought into the marriage.31  Ordinarily the difference between 
the two did not matter, but the dispute between the Burrs made the 
assumptions visible.  The court resolved the case by finessing the issue, 
holding only that the wife was “entitled to a support corresponding to her 
rank and condition in life, and the fortune of [her] husband.”32 
The tension in cases like Burr33 lay in how to determine the amount.34  
A trial court had awarded the wife an amount comparable to the life estate 
she would have been accorded at her husband’s death,35 while a dissenting 
opinion objected that “[a]t her age it would be unsuitable, even ludicrous, to 
lavish the revenues of a principality in the adornment of her person, and she 
will not require to be fed like the profligate Egyptian courtezan [sic] with 
pearls dissolved in acid.”36  Alimony is arguably coherent during this period, 
as it reinforces the indissoluble nature of marriage, women’s inability to 
manage their own property, and the husband’s ongoing duty of support, but 
those serving on the New York high court of the 1840’s still found the 
distinction between distribution of an estate and support unresolved—and 
 
30. Burr v. Burr, 7 Hill 207, 233 (N.Y. 1843) (opinion of Bockee, Sen.). 
31. Compare id. at 209–12 (opinion of Nelson, C.J.) (discussing what portion of the estate was 
suitable “for the support and maintenance of the wife during separation” and finding that an alimony 
of one-fifth to one-sixth of the husband’s income was appropriate), with id. at 244 (opinion of Root, 
Sen.) (finding that a $6,000 alimony was sufficiently “suitable [for] support and maintenance”). 
32. Id. at 211 (opinion of Nelson, C.J.). 
33. Burr v. Burr, 7 Hill 207 (N.Y. 1843). 
34. Indeed, even among those supporting the award, some noted that the largest alimony awards 
tended to come in cases where the wife contributed a substantial part of the marital estate.  Id. at 
219–22 (opinion of Strong, Sen.).  The opinion by Senator Strong also embraced something close 
to a partnership analysis: 
Whatever increases his fortune is regarded by the law of civilized life as adding also 
to her prosperity.  If he becomes rich, she is not to continue poor. . . .  If a great 
abundance of wealth is thought so desirable by the husband that he has devoted a life 
of toil and perplexity to its accumulation, a just and fair proportion of it . . . is supposed 
to be equally desirable and necessary for her, who has traveled with him for a long 
period in the same path of acquisition, whose mind has been bent and moulded 
constantly and for years towards the same objects of pursuit which have engrossed his 
thoughts and invited his energies, and whose domestic economy, directed to the same 
purposes, has been, if not the starting point, at least a leading auxiliary of his success. 
Id. at 215–16. 
35. Id. at 208. 
36. Id. at 233 (opinion of Bockee, Sen.).  The couple had been married for over thirty years.  Id. 
at 212 (opinion of Nelson, C.J.). 
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therefore the type of precision that constitutes coherence in other parts of the 
legal system to be lacking. 
Today, the first two tensions that produce incoherence (the pragmatic 
complexities that distinguish cases involving resolution of a single claim and 
divorce cases, and between ownership claims grounded in desert-versus-
need-based claims based on policy considerations) persist.  At the same time, 
a third reason for the incoherence of alimony comes into play: the changing 
meaning of marriage in an era of economically independent women.  In the 
marriages of today, the solo bread earner and permanent homemaker of the 
traditional model are anachronisms, and “shared financial and domestic 
contributions [serve] as the foundation for marriage in the post-industrial 
economy.”37  This new model rests on a changed social script: one that 
replaces women’s dependence on their husbands with spousal inter-
dependence.38  “The new script assumes commensurate contributions, but it 
does not distinguish between financial and domestic ones.”39  “Perhaps most 
critically, though, it assumes joint responsibility—for the family’s finances 
and [if babies arrive] for any resulting children.”40  In this new world, many 
families depend on two incomes and few jobs are secure; both spouses must 
therefore be prepared to contribute financially and domestically.41  Moreover, 
two incomes do not just cushion the impact of layoffs.  They also create the 
flexibility necessary to retool if new opportunities require new degrees or 
children’s needs require cycling in and out of the workplace.42  In this script, 
women have finally become fully autonomous adults, and both men and 
women believe it is only worth marrying if they find a true partner who can 
make the new marital script work.43 
Starnes is more willing than we are to find coherence in the history of 
alimony and ties the disappearance of that coherence to the complicated role 
of fault in determining awards.  She suggests that the real problem for 
alimony comes with the “appearance of absolute divorce and the supposed 
end of coverture [which] meant the end of caregivers’ lifetime support ticket 
and also the end of a clear rationale for alimony.”44  That is, she ties the initial 
rationale for alimony to specific performance of the husband’s duty of 
support during a period of separation in which the marriage nonetheless 
 
37. CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 15, at 93. 
38. Id. at 110. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 111. 
41. Id. at 95–97. 
42. See generally HANNA ROSIN, THE END OF MEN AND THE RISE OF WOMEN 47–77 (2012) 
(explaining that couples’ roles have become increasingly fluid and interchangeable and that division 
of earnings may “flip-flop,” allowing each partner a chance to be the primary provider). 
43. See KATHLEEN GERSON, THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: HOW A NEW GENERATION IS 
RESHAPING FAMILY, WORK, AND GENDER IN AMERICA 11–12, 126–28 (2010) (noting that young 
adults express wariness about partners who expect to be supported). 
44. STARNES, supra note 3, at 34. 
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continued and questions its role once the states authorized true divorce.45  By 
the end of the nineteenth century, many of the American states permitted 
judicial divorce actions and adopted the Married Women’s Property Acts, 
which allowed women to retain control of their separate property during the 
marriage and ownership at divorce.46  The women thus regained control of 
the property they owned and the husband’s duty of support presumably ended 
with dissolution of the marriage.  Still, the mothers of young children did not 
typically work outside the home if their husbands could support them, and 
even with return of their separate property, they risked impoverishment at 
divorce.  Starnes argues that the principal justification for alimony in this era 
became fault; that is, “a husband who committed adultery, for example, 
would be required to pay alimony to an injured caregiver” as damages for 
breach of the marital contract.47  With adoption of no-fault divorce, the fault 
justification disappeared, leaving no apparent basis for the continuation of 
support.48 
In fact, no state treated alimony as a true system of damages, attempting 
to measure the “innocent” spouse’s loss with precision,49 and by the time no-
fault reforms were adopted, the insistence on a showing of fault by one, and 
only one, party had become a farce.  As Starnes acknowledges, many couples 
colluded to establish that fault existed.50  The result for these couples more 
closely approximated a system of divorce though mutual consent.  Moreover, 
with erosion of the barriers to divorce, relatively few states banned alimony 
altogether on the basis of a dependent spouse’s transgressions,51 and those 
 
45. She can conclude that alimony during this period was “coherent,” however, only by 
overlooking the tensions between its role in distributing the estate versus providing basic 
maintenance. 
46. Carbone, supra note 23, at 49; see also STARNES, supra note 3, at 34 (noting that by the end 
of the nineteenth century, every state had at least allowed for some form of absolute divorce). 
47. STARNES, supra note 3, at 35.  In fact, the role of fault in divorce is more complex.  Fault, 
as grounds for divorce, never served the same purpose as breach of contract, which has traditionally 
allowed parties to renege on contractual obligations so long as they compensated the other parties 
for their expectation losses.  Instead, it reinforced the permanence of marriage.  Neither party, nor 
both parties jointly, had the power to end a marriage without a showing of fault.  Margaret F. Brinig 
& June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62 TUL. L. REV. 855, 861 (1988); 
see also Carbone, supra note 21, at 1474–75 (emphasizing that expectation damages that allow one 
spouse to enjoy a certain standard of living at the other’s expense makes no sense when there is no 
obligation to stay married and no way to determine fault).  Within this system, fault served to free 
an innocent spouse from the bonds of a union that could be shown to no longer exist due to the 
adultery, desertion, or extreme cruelty of the other party.  Brinig & Carbone, supra, at 861.  It thus 
justified not just a legal separation but the end of the union, which was necessary to permit the 
innocent spouse to remarry.  Id. at 862. 
48. STARNES, supra note 3, at 36. 
49. See, e.g., Lyon v. Lyon, 21 Conn. 185, 196–97 (Conn. 1851) (rejecting the characterization 
of alimony as damages). 
50. STARNES, supra note 3, at 34. 
51. Carbone, supra note 23, at 53. 
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states (Starnes mentions North and South Carolina)52 tended to be 
concentrated in the more conservative parts of the country.  Other states 
allowed consideration of fault in determining the amount of an award but still 
seemed reluctant to adopt an absolute rule that might leave a dependent 
spouse penniless and dependent on the public fisc.53 
Even when the woman claiming alimony was the innocent spouse, the 
courts continued the debate in Burr v. Burr and disagreed as to whether it 
made more sense to characterize alimony as a distribution of the marital 
estate that remained titled primarily in the husband’s name or as a 
continuation of support justified by the combination of the husband’s fault 
and the wife’s need.54  This debate had two consequences.  First, it affected 
the issue of whether an alimony award ended upon remarriage.  If it were a 
distribution of the estate, it would not; if it constituted continuation of the 
marital duty of support, it would.55  Second, courts expressed concern about 
the effect on the divorce rate.  A Massachusetts court in 1835 observed, for 
example, that “the doctrine, which no one will doubt, that a wife is not to be 
encouraged to leave her husband in violation of the marriage contract, by the 
expectation of enjoying a separate maintenance, and that in such cases a court 
of equity may interfere.”56  If alimony were in fact a distribution (or buyout) 
of the jointly owned marital estate, either party, as Starnes argues later, ought 
to be able to end the union with his or her share of the marital estate intact.57  
Few courts were willing to grant women that much independence.58 
The adoption of no-fault divorce did nothing to resolve the debate over 
the nature of alimony, though it did contribute to a changing understanding 
of the nature of marriage.  Implementation of divorce reform over the course 
of the seventies and eighties coincided with the large-scale entry of women, 
including the married mothers of young children, into the labor market; 
skyrocketing divorce rates that reflected in part the changing nature of 
women’s roles; and changing legal treatment of marriage, which became 
 
52. STARNES, supra note 3, at 35. 
53. See Carbone, supra note 23, at 52–53 (explaining that courts did not often exercise their 
discretion against guilty wives). 
54. Id. at 52–54 (summarizing nineteenth-century cases). 
55. Indeed, even if the awards were viewed as damages, remarriage might be characterized as 
mitigation of damages, but then, of course, a true contract award would be reduced to a liquidated 
sum that took the likelihood of mitigation into account. 
56. Ayer v. Ayer, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 327, 333–34 (Mass. 1835). 
57. June Carbone has argued elsewhere that the problem with this approach is not necessarily 
the principle of ownership but the failure to recognize the offsetting interests.  A wronged husband, 
for example, also has a loss from the end of a marriage.  The larger the share of marital assets he 
retains, the better his prospects for remarriage in an era that places a premium on male income.  See 
Carbone, supra note 23, at 64–65 (describing how alimony obligations take away from a man’s 
ability to support a new family). 
58. For a discussion of the practical effect of such restrictions, see Betsey Stevenson & Justin 
Wolfers, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Divorce Laws and Family Distress, 121 Q.J. ECON. 
267, 269–70 (2006). 
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effectively terminable at will.59  Marital property reform, which often 
accompanied adoption of no-fault divorce, changed what had been title 
systems to marital property or equitable distribution regimes.  In accordance 
with these systems, the courts acquired the power to divide the marital estate 
to recognize homemaker contributions and to address the need of a lower 
earning spouse following divorce.60  Divorce awards tended overwhelmingly 
to become fifty-fifty divisions, but scholars disagreed as to whether these 
awards reflected women’s contributions to accumulation of the marital estate 
(and thus recognition of their ownership claims to property accumulated 
during the marriage) or allocation of a larger portion of the “husband’s 
property” to address the wife’s need (and thus use of the marital estate to 
provide support or compensation for caretaking).61  Precisely because divorce 
courts do not need to justify the basis for their awards with precision, the 
basis for the fifty-fifty awards has never been definitely resolved.62 
The core of Starnes’s critique is focused here.  No-fault divorce ended 
the insistence, however unconvincing it had become by the seventies and 
eighties, that marriage was a life-long relationship.  All states now recognize 
no-fault grounds for divorce, either allowing an immediate divorce if one 
party alleges irreconcilable differences or similar grounds, or if the parties 
live apart for a period of time.63  In a large number of jurisdictions, divorce 
reforms precluded any consideration of fault, and in other states the 
subsequent judicial decisions moved away from fault (in the breach of 
contract sense) as a major factor in divorce awards.64  Women were no longer 
dependent solely as a result of their gender or even necessarily because of 
caretaking responsibilities.  And with greater economic and legal 
 
59. CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 15, at 112–13.  For discussion of the changes associated 
with no-fault divorce, see generally Stéphane Mechoulan, Divorce Laws and the Structure of the 
American Family, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 143, 149–51 (2006) and Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, 
Marriage and Divorce: Changes and their Driving Forces, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2007, at 27, 46.  
The economists maintain generally that the parties bargain around the legal changes.  Mechoulan, 
for example, shows a change in divorce patterns following adoption of pure no-fault statutes, with 
the rates peaking in the years immediately after adoption but then leveling off as the parties adjust 
their expectations.  Mechoulan, supra, at 165.  In particular, Mechoulan shows that traditional 
couples experienced the greatest increase in divorce following adoption of no-fault reforms but that 
the rates level off for couples married later.  Id. 
60. STARNES, supra note 3, at 68–73. 
61. Compare Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship of Property Division and Alimony: The 
Division of Property to Address Need, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 849–52 (1988) (finding that most 
equitable division statutes result in approximately equal property division and concluding that 
property division is therefore not being used to address need), with Joan M. Krauskopf, Theories of 
Property Division/Spousal Support: Searching for Solutions to the Mystery, 23 FAM. L.Q. 253, 273–
75 (1989) (arguing that award of 50% of the property may in fact be intended to redress need if the 
court remains unconvinced that the wife’s contribution to the marital estate equals the husband’s). 
62. See Baker, supra note 12, at 329–31, 333–35, on the courts’ increased preference for 
mechanical rules of division rather than normative standards or discretion. 
63. STARNES, supra note 3, at 36; Stevenson & Wolfers, supra note 58, at 273. 
64. STARNES, supra note 3, at 73–74. 
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independence, women came to initiate two-thirds of marital dissolutions.65  
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act dealt with these changes by 
advocating a “clean break.”66 
Starnes argues that these reforms shortchange homemakers—and they 
do.  She correctly observes that the assaults on alimony often rest on 
inaccurate assumptions that understate the impact of caretaking on both the 
caretaker’s income and family well-being, overstate the degree of gender 
equality in either the workplace or the assumption of family responsibilities, 
and fail to recognize the societal stake in children and those who care for 
them.67  The move away from fault-based divorce and the equal division of 
marital property eliminated the two principal historic justifications for 
alimony.  Moreover, most couples have few assets outside of the family 
home,68 and as Starnes documents, legislatures and courts are increasingly 
concluding that case-by-case judgments create too much uncertainty and 
potential for political backlash.69  The result is a move away from discretion 
towards guidelines70 that, as Starnes also suggests, are designed to limit the 
length and duration of alimony.71 
This disproportionately affects long-term homemakers, who typically 
married in an earlier era, whose employment skills have long since atrophied, 
who will reach retirement age before the investment necessary to begin a new 
career begins to pay off, and who enjoy relatively fewer opportunities to 
remarry than younger women or men of the same age.  Indeed, as Starnes 
acknowledges, many states cut back on clean break provisions to ensure more 
support precisely because of the plight of long-term homemakers,72 and even 
 
65. Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, “These Boots Are Made for Walking”: Why Most 
Divorce Filers Are Women, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 126, 128 tbl.1 (2000) (stating that two-thirds 
of those filing for divorce are women). 
66. STARNES, supra note 3, at 36. 
67. Id. at 26–31. 
68. Id. at 69.  Of course, this is true in part because most couples divorce relatively early in the 
marriage and, even in longer marriages, those with fewer assets are more likely to divorce.  See 
ALISON AUGHINBAUGH ET AL., U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE: 
PATTERNS BY GENDER, RACE, AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 17 (2013), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2013/article/pdf/marriage-and-divorce-patterns-by-gender-race-and-
educational-attainment.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/GE6T-SH68 (stating that as marriages age 
the possibility of divorce decreases); Jeffrey Dew et al., Examining the Relationship Between 
Financial Issues and Divorce, 61 FAM. REL. 615, 624–26 (2012) (indicating that financial conflict 
acted as a predictor of divorce among an older data set). 
69. STARNES, supra note 3, at 76, 88–90. 
70. As an example, consider MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 53 (West Supp. 2014). 
71. STARNES, supra note 3, at 76. 
72. See id. at 50–51 (explaining that Minnesota enacted legislation to protect awards of 
permanent alimony and that other state courts also intervened to protect long-term alimony awards 
in the face of hostile statutes). 
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the new more restrictive divorce legislation currently in vogue typically 
leaves open the possibility of support after longer term marriages.73 
She nonetheless stacks the deck by starting the book with “Casey’s 
story.”  Casey had been a full-time homemaker through years of marriage.74  
After the children were grown, her husband, a professor at a major university, 
came home and announced that he had fallen in love with someone else and 
wanted a divorce.75  Casey, in her fifties, was left with almost nothing—no 
employment history, no skills, no significant property settlement, no child 
support and no alimony.76  She “ran away” to another city, a small apartment 
and a minimum wage job at Starnes’s law firm.77  Starnes reports that “[o]ne 
day Casey didn’t show up for work. . . .  She had traveled back to her 
hometown, to her old house, to her old garage, where she sat in a car and took 
her life.”78 
While Starnes is right that women like Casey still exist, Casey herself 
was the product of a different era.79  Starnes met Casey while she was a 
paralegal,80 presumably before Starnes graduated from law school.  If Casey 
had fully grown children, she had probably married twenty to thirty years 
earlier, in the fifties or early sixties.  If she is characteristic of the women of 
that era, she would have married at a younger age than the comparable group 
of women today and done so before completing a college degree or shortly 
after graduation.  And not only would she have had a difficult time staying 
employed during her marriage, her husband might have forbidden it.  When 
her husband came home and told her he was leaving her for someone else, he 
was ending a marriage that reflected the rules of another era.81 
Alongside Casey’s story, however, is another tale from the same time 
period that raises the same issues: Doonesbury’s Joanie Caucus.82  In the 
seventies, Joanie felt trapped in the homemaker’s role.  In a manner that 
shocked some and resonated with others, she walked out on her husband and 
 
73. See id. at 79 (noting that the restrictive alimony statutes in Maine and Texas still allow 
alimony payments for long-term marriages). 
74. Id. at 2. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. For reflections from popular culture of women’s role in that era, see Sara Boboltz, Awful 
‘50s Marriage Advice Shows What Our Mothers and Grandmothers Were up Against, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Sept. 26, 2014, 2:30 AM), http://www.huffintonpost.com/2014/09/26/can-this-marriage-be-
saved-advice_n_5829870.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Y35H-DYX5. 
80. STARNES, supra note 3, at 2. 
81. Mechoulan, supra note 59, at 147, documents the increase in divorce rates that followed 
adoption of no-fault divorce and suggests that the increase disproportionately affected marriages 
such as Casey’s.  In contrast, he shows the leveling off of divorce rates with adjustment to the new 
regime as couples recognized the lack of protection for long-term homemakers.  Id. at 165. 
82. Joanie Caucus, WASH. POST, http://doonesbury.washingtonpost.com/strip/cast/member 
/13, archived at http://perma.cc/U9HE-2WKE. 
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young daughter.83  She too ran away, in her case to escape a traditional 
marriage and ultimately to recreate her life, which she did, becoming a 
lawyer, working as a legislative aide, and then moving into private practice.84  
Should she have been able to walk out and still be entitled to a buyout of her 
share of her distraught husband’s income?  And, today, if Rick Redfern, 
Joanie’s blogger husband who lost his job with the Washington Post,85 
walked out on her, would he be entitled to alimony on the basis of Joanie’s 
presumably higher earning capacity as a lawyer?  To answer these questions 
requires asking how we understand marriage, gender, and homemaking 
today. 
II. Can Alimony Be Justified? 
The strongest part of the book is Starnes’s effort to revitalize alimony 
for the modern era.  After surveying other theories that seek to justify 
alimony, Starnes offers her own: “[A]n enriched partnership model that 
analogizes alimony to a buyout.”86  The concept of a partnership, Starnes 
argues, recognizes the equality of each spouse’s contributions to the 
marriage.  As she notes, marriage, like partnerships, typically begins with 
trust and without a written agreement that sets out precise expectations.87  In 
the absence of an express agreement, the law supplies default terms that 
govern partnerships.88  Starnes, however, is elusive on the question of 
whether the parties can contract around these terms,89 and indeed, suggests 
that her proposed partnership terms come from the state rather than the 
presumed intent of the parties.  As in business partnerships, “the state 
determines the economic price of exit,” and in marriage, “it is important that 
the state fix this price, for if the marriage promise matters, it must have 
consequences.”90 
To establish such consequences, Starnes revisits the marital exchange 
of promises and defines them as “a mutual commitment to pool labor, time, 
and talent in the expectation that these contributions will generate shared 
value in the form of income and a family home.”91  Once the marriage is 
 
83. See id. (describing her liberation “from a disasterous marriage”). 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. STARNES, supra note 3, at 147. 
87. Id. at 150. 
88. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103(a), 6 U.L.A. 73 (1997). 
89. For example, she describes her proposals as “default rules” which implies that the parties 
can contract around them, STARNES, supra note 3, at 160, and she notes that the terms apply 
“[a]bsent an agreement otherwise” but says nothing in either place about the extent of the parties’ 
ability to negate her proposed terms.  Id. at 155.  She does say, however, that couples who want an 
“every man for himself” relationship can opt into one.  Id. at 161.  For a discussion of such terms, 
see, for example, UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT, 9C U.L.A. 15 (2012). 
90. STARNES, supra note 3, at 155. 
91. Id. at 156. 
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underway, particularly in marriages with children,92 the parties seek to 
optimize the family combination of income and services, and couples often 
choose to trade off labor-market participation and homemaking.  These 
decisions often “generate a higher income stream and enhanced human 
capital for the spouse who invests more extensively in paid employment.”93  
A divorce may terminate the relationship, but in a marriage like Casey’s,94 
the earnings stream made possible by the couple’s joint contributions 
continues, with her husband reaping all of the benefits they would have 
shared had the marriage continued.  Starnes argues that this is not a 
partnership dissolution.95  Instead, it is the equivalent of one partner deciding 
to terminate the involvement of the other in what had been their joint 
enterprise.96  To be able to do so, the partner who reaps the benefit of the 
continuing earning stream should have to “buy out” the other.97  Over the last 
part of the book, Starnes develops a detailed proposal for doing so.98 
Starnes’s partnership rationale captures the sense of modern 
relationships as relatively egalitarian commitments premised on sharing.99  
Both the law and popular culture portray marriage as an unconditional 
commitment in which the parties form an interdependent relationship in 
which they pool income, assets, efforts, and children;100 describing it as “a 
mutual commitment to pool labor, time, and talent”101 therefore makes sense.  
The more difficult challenge is to give content to the terms in a way that 
justifies Starnes’s buyout proposals, which presume that this pooling 
enterprise lasts after the marriage ends.  This requires unpacking a number of 
underlying concepts. 
Starnes eliminates the need to discuss ownership of human capital by 
positing a partnership ideal that includes a commitment to pool resources 
over the course of the marriage.  A partnership is a specialized form of 
 
92. Starnes does discuss the applicability of a buyout to marriages without children, drawing 
on a Canadian alimony guideline project.  Id. at 159. 
93. Id. at 156. 
94. Id. at 2. 
95. See id. at 155 (“A spouse’s decision to leave the partnership does not necessarily trigger a 
winding up of any shared marital enterprise.”). 
96. Id. at 154–55, 160. 
97. Id. at 160. 
98. Id. at 149–68. 
99. See id. at 149 (describing the partnership model of marriage as espousing “egalitarian 
principles” that also “infuse family norms if not all family realities”). 
100. Indeed, poorer women often describe their failure to marry in exactly such terms; they take 
the commitment to marriage very seriously and are therefore reluctant to commit unless they feel 
that their partner merits such commitment.  See generally Kathryn Edin & Joanna M. Reed, Why 
Don’t They Just Get Married? Barriers to Marriage Among the Disadvantaged, 15 MARRIAGE & 
CHILD WELLBEING, Fall 2005, at 117 (examining a number of barriers to marriage among 
disadvantaged Americans, including perceived expectations about marital relationships, aversions 
to divorce, and economic barriers). 
101. STARNES, supra note 3, at 160. 
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contract that includes default terms that apply in the absence of an agreement 
to the contrary.102  These default terms can come from two sources.  Most 
typically, they reflect terms that can be assumed to be those to which the 
parties might agree if they were to write an explicit contract.103  Such terms 
presumably reflect either common assumptions about how to conduct such a 
relationship or basic principles of fairness.104  Alternatively, the terms may 
reflect provisions imposed by law or public policy.  The parties are ordinarily 
free to contract around the former, but not the latter.  In a prenuptial 
agreement, for example, the parties may ordinarily specify that particular 
pieces of property will remain separately owned by one of the spouses, but 
they may not use a prenuptial agreement to eliminate a child’s right to support 
or to leave either spouse entirely dependent on the public fisc.105 
The cornerstone of Starnes’s proposal is the view that each party’s 
respective income is the product of investment during the course of the 
marriage.106  She thus proposes that marriage be seen as a partnership that 
rests on the agreement to pool investments.107  At divorce, parents continue 
to share children,108 and they should similarly be required to share income.  
That agreement is premised on a contractual perspective of what a fair 
exchange should look like.  
Yet, Starnes does not fully work through either the assumptions that 
might underlie a mutual consent theory or the alternative public policy 
justification.  She would presume that each spouse contributed equally, and 
although she would build in the length of the marriage as a factor, she would 
make no provision for tallying individual contributions, for taking into 
account the circumstances that led to the break-up, or to the accumulation of 
 
102. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
103. One way to justify default terms, however, is to pick the terms that favor the party with 
less bargaining power.  The other party is more likely, in any event, to initiate a premarital 
agreement, and premarital agreements more commonly seek to eliminate responsibility for spousal 
support than to augment it.  See J. Thomas Oldham, With All My Worldly Goods I Thee Endow, or 
Maybe Not: A Reevaluation of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act After Three Decades, 19 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 83, 89–90 (2011) (describing the “stereotypic” premarital agreement 
scenario as a situation where the wealthier party “instructs his or her lawyer to draft an agreement 
and limits the claims of the other party . . . if the parties divorce”). 
104. Fairness typically involves notions of reciprocity.  Standard contract measures such as 
expectation and restitution depend on measures of reciprocal exchange, which in turn come from 
the nature of the exchange of marital promises (expectation) or the relationship of a benefit 
conferred on one party that corresponds to a loss suffered by the other party (restitution).  See Brinig 
& Carbone, supra note 47, at 870–72 (discussing the nature of the reliance and expectation interest 
in marriage). 
105. See, e.g., UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 10, 9C U.L.A. 27 (2012). 
106. See STARNES, supra note 3, at 140 (“As an equal stakeholder in the marriage, the primary 
caregiver is entitled to an equal share of the financial fruits of marriage.”). 
107. Id. at 160. 
108. See id. at 169–70 (stating that contemporary norms emphasize coparenting after divorce). 
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capital in a particular spouse’s earning capacity.109  While we agree that in 
cases like Casey’s alimony is justified,110 we doubt that the proposals fit the 
myriad of modern cases likely to arise. 
First, Starnes needs to say more about whether couples would in fact 
agree that the lower earning spouse can decide to end the marriage and take 
a substantial share of the other spouse’s income.  Most scholars, like Starnes, 
reject fault principles as a basis for divorce allocations in part because there 
is no agreement on what fault entails, and we agree with that conclusion.111  
Yet, it is important to acknowledge the tradeoffs: there may simply be some 
interests that cannot be protected in the absence of fault, and the lack of 
confidence in the permanence of marriage necessarily changes the parties’ 
expectations about the nature of marriage itself.112  Starnes states that “it is 
important that the state fix [the buyout] price, for if the marriage promise 
matters, it must have consequences”113 without discussing the most important 
marital promise, the one to stay married.  Indeed, the gendered division of 
labor that lies at the core of the Starnes partnership model makes little sense 
in the absence of a conviction that the marriage will last.  The poster child 
for Starnes’s defense of alimony—full-time homemaker Terry Hekker whose 
husband left her for another woman after forty years of marriage—admits 
that she is a relic from a different era.114  Hekker states that if she had to do 
it over again, she would still have married the same man and had the same 
 
109. See id. at 140 (noting that gain theory is “generally not interested in relative spousal 
contributions”). 
110. Of course, one of the reasons Casey’s case is so compelling is that her husband left her for 
someone else.  So he gets the benefits of his higher earnings and the ability to remain married to 
what he views as a better wife, while Casey gets neither a share in the income the marriage made 
possible nor similar opportunities to remarry.  If she had left him for a higher earning spouse, 
however, the fairness of Starnes’s proposals would seem quite different.  Although the data is sparse, 
there is some indication that while women initiate the majority of divorces, they are less likely to 
do so in precisely these circumstances: that is, after a long-term marriage with a traditional division 
of labor where the husband earns substantially more than the dependent wife.  Casey’s case is more 
typical than that of a long-term homemaker seeking to end a marriage for a new partner.  See 
Carbone, supra note 23, at 73, 75 (describing a case where a husband divorces his wife after thirty-
five years so he can marry his mistress as “typical”). 
111. The difficulty with fault in the breach of contract sense lies with the absence of agreement 
on what constitutes justification for the decision to leave.  Starnes’s example of the brief affair with 
the tennis pro is a good example.  STARNES, supra note 3, at 73.  Infidelity has long been associated 
with a double standard for men and women, but without that, there is no agreement on when 
infidelity creates irreconcilable differences and when it should be forgiven.  For a more complete 
discussion of this issue, see Carbone, supra note 23, at 64–65 (discussing the role of gender in 
allocating fault in the context of marriage and divorce). 
112. See Carbone, supra note 21, at 1472–76 (discussing the need for fault in order to award 
expectation damages, thereby protecting incentives to avoid inefficient marital breaches and 
encouraging beneficial specialization within marriages). 
113. STARNES, supra note 3, at 155. 
114. Terry Martin Hekker, Paradise Lost (Domestic Division), N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2006, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2006/01/01/fashion/sundaystyles/01LOVE.html?pagewanted=all, archived at 
http://perma.cc/G7HA-DRMM. 
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number of children.115  But she would not have permanently given up a 
career.  She quotes with approval her niece’s determination to stay in the 
workforce so that she doesn’t “end up like Aunt Terry.”116 
Second, Starnes’s pooling principle looks at the parties’ combined post-
divorce income,117 yet Starnes also insists that the policies that justify sharing 
gains are not identical to those that require sharing losses.118  The argument 
she makes for sharing gains rests on the assumption that post-divorce income 
reflects marital contributions that increase over the course of the marriage,119  
though she also acknowledges that a commitment to pooling resources that 
combines gains and losses better addresses an era of stagnating incomes.120  
Do losses rest on the same principle?  If a full-time homemaker has suffered 
a loss in earning capacity as a result of contributions to the marital enterprise, 
it does.121  Losses, however, may also reflect layoffs or economic downturns; 
the illness or personal limitations of the individual (with economic downturns 
often compounding factors such as substance abuse);122 or continuing 
discrimination in the workplace.123  Greg, in the example at the beginning of 
this Review, has become a full-time homemaker because he lost his job and 
could not easily find another.  In these circumstances, the disparity in spousal 
incomes does not necessarily reflect either his lost income (which may be 
practically zero if he cannot find another job at the height of a financial 
recession) or his contributions to his wife’s income, which may reflect her 
willingness to work longer hours because of the family’s dependence on her 
 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. STARNES, supra note 3, at 164–65. 
118. Id. at 145. 
119. Id. at 156–57. 
120. Id. at 157. 
121. Id. at 157, 160.  It does in part because the value of the homemaker’s contribution to the 
marital enterprise can be presumed to be at least as great as their opportunity cost—the value of the 
foregone earnings. 
122. See Clifford L. Broman et al., The Impact of Unemployment on Families, 2 MICH. FAM. 
REV. 83, 88–99 (1996) (surveying workers at a closing industrial plant and finding that plant 
closings led to increased financial hardship, increased tension and conflict among family members, 
and deteriorating family relationships overall); Tony Dokoupil, Lifestyle: Laid-Off Men Don’t Do 
Dishes, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 20, 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/lifestyle-laid-men-dont-do-dishes-
82201, archived at http://perma.cc/PF7J-MT42 (describing the effects of economic downturns and 
increases in unemployment on men, including potentially contributing to increases in domestic 
violence or alcohol abuse). 
123. See, e.g., JOAN C. WILLIAMS & RACHEL DEMPSEY, WHAT WORKS FOR WOMEN AT WORK 
299 (2014) (identifying gender bias against women in the workplace and describing its negative 
effects); Joan C. Williams, Double Jeopardy? An Empirical Study with Implications for the Debates 
over Implicit Bias and Intersectionality, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 185, 202–03 (2014) (discussing 
the “Maternal Wall,” in which mothers’ career commitments are questioned by their employers, 
both benevolently and with hostility, after giving birth or adopting a child). 
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income.124  The implied agreement to pool resources seems to resurrect the 
“for better or for worse” aspect of marriage vows without a corresponding 
agreement either to stay together or on what constitutes shirking of 
partnership responsibilities. 
Finally, the partnership analogy itself may be flawed.  One problem is 
that a partnership typically has a clear goal: as the Uniform Partnership Act 
proclaims, a “partnership” involves “an association of two or more persons 
to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.”125  Starnes does not spell out 
precisely how she conceives of the remade marital enterprise.  The buyout 
remedy she proposes means that “the higher-income spouse should buy out 
the other spouse’s interest in the financial arm of the marital partnership.”126  
This meets her goal of compensating a spouse who has assumed caregiving 
responsibilities and is, consequently, not a full participant in the workforce.  
It leaves out, however, spouses who have assumed a role as primary caregiver 
and breadwinner, or even marriages where, say, one spouse works full-time 
for the government and has a limited wage scale, while the caregiving spouse 
works in the legal or financial world, albeit part-time, but with a higher 
salary.  When Kathy Edin and Tim Nelson describe the break-up of fragile 
relationships, they often describe men who, pressed to contribute financially, 
take up drug dealing while the mothers of their children engage in less 
remunerative, but more stable, employment.127  Are either of these 
activities—the drug dealing or the support of the drug dealer on parole—part 
of the marital partnership?  And if they are, do the obligations to share profits 
really continue after divorce? 
Moreover, Starnes’s proposal rests on the proposition that any time a 
marriage ends, the higher earning spouse, by continuing to earn money in the 
same way he or she did during the marriage, is continuing a portion of the 
partnership enterprise.  Buyouts are only appropriate, of course, when the 
partnership continues; ending a partnership involves winding it up.128  
Consider how the partnership principle might work for George Clooney and 
 
124. Indeed, individuals may vary widely as to whether they view longer work hours, 
necessitated by the other spouse’s loss of income, as a net advantage in achieving career goals or as 
a burden they would prefer to forego.  PAUL AMATO ET AL., ALONE TOGETHER: HOW MARRIAGE 
IN AMERICA IS CHANGING 123–24 (2007). 
125. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101(6), 6 U.L.A. 61 (1997). 
126. STARNES, supra note 3, at 156. 
127. KATHRYN EDIN & TIMOTHY J. NELSON, DOING THE BEST I CAN 74–76 (2013). 
128. See Baker, supra note 12, at 338 (“[W]hen partnerships dissolve, the partners do not have 
any ongoing obligation to each other . . . .”).  Indeed, Starnes repeatedly emphasizes that the buyout 
she is proposing is not a partnership dissolution.  She states that “[a] spouse’s decision to leave the 
partnership does not necessarily trigger a winding up of any shared marital enterprise.”  STARNES, 
supra note 3, at 155. 
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Amal Alamuddin, who were married in September 2014.129  If they divorce 
six years later, with no children born to the marriage and no change in their 
work activities, then Starnes would consider Clooney’s acting income for a 
period after the divorce as a continuation of the partnership enterprise, and 
he must buy out his wife’s share, even though his earning capacity was 
established before the marriage and continued unchanged through the 
marriage and subsequent divorce.  Starnes softens the conclusion that the 
partnership enterprise continues by limiting the duration of the buyout 
payments,130 but the principle remains: all personal income is treated as 
jointly owned irrespective of the source of the investment that produced it, 
and therefore simply continuing to earn money in the same job one had before 
the marriage becomes continuation of the partnership enterprise.  Of course, 
in George Clooney’s case, this might simply trigger a much more complex 
premarital agreement, but for others we suspect it would come as quite a 
surprise. 
III. Can Alimony Really Be Saved? 
Alimony, whether serving as liquidation of a marital estate that 
remained in the husband’s control, compensation for the fault that ended the 
marriage, or Starnes’s proposal to pool human capital, has always been about 
the status of women.131  The most fundamental challenge for its continuation 
therefore rests on reconciling alimony with an era in which the majority of 
women, including 71% of mothers with children under eighteen, are in the 
labor market.132 
This requires reconsideration of the nature of marriage, not just as a 
partnership ideal, which arguably it has long been, or as a relationship 
between equals, which has emerged more recently, but as an integrated part 
of a new economic model.  We have argued at length elsewhere that the 
dismantling of the traditional family took place in two stages tied to the 
development of today’s capitalist economy.  The first involved the 
 
129. Bob Woletz, Celebrity Weddings 2014: Costly and Captivating, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/14/fashion/weddings/celebrity-weddings-2014-costly-and 
-captivating.html, archived at http://perma.cc/7CVR-FW7W. 
130. STARNES, supra note 3, at 164–66. 
131. It wasn’t until 1979 that the Supreme Court struck down the gendered basis of alimony.  
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283–84 (1979).  Even today, a very small percentage of alimony recipients 
are men.  See STARNES, supra note 3, at 27 (noting that the majority of alimony recipients are 
female). 
132. EILEEN PATTEN & KIM PARKER, PEW RESEARCH CTR., A GENDER REVERSAL ON 
CAREER ASPIRATIONS: YOUNG WOMEN NOW TOP YOUNG MEN IN VALUING A HIGH-PAYING 
CAREER 6 fig. (2012), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2012/04/Women-in-the-
Workplace.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/GMU7-3XYZ; see also News Release, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Employment Characteristics of Families—2013, at 2 (2013), 
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/famee.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/43N9-
8A6A (showing that approximately 65% of married mothers worked outside the home in 2013). 
2015] Whither/Wither Alimony? 945 
 
transformation of an agricultural economy into an industrial one.  In this era, 
husbands, who had previously overseen the farm or the shop next door to the 
family home, entered the paid labor force while wives took over supervision 
of a remade domestic realm shorn of productive activities such as clothes 
making or bean picking.133  While economist Gary Becker described this as 
specialization between husbands and wives,134 in fact, it is more accurately 
described as increased specialization among men, with reorganization of the 
middle-class household to funnel greater investment in children, education, 
and the delayed marriages that became the hallmark of the new industrial-
age professional and managerial classes.135  With time, these families set the 
standard for working-class households that, with a “family wage” for 
working-class men, became able to afford a similarly gendered division of 
family labor. 
The industrial era is over and the information economy has dissolved 
the sharp separation between workplace and family, men and women.  This 
new system involves greater demand for women’s paid labor and 
opportunities for greater specialization among women, as the most successful 
women hire other women—and buy fast food and wrinkle-free fabrics—to 
help meet the families’ domestic needs.136  Investment in children, education, 
and later marriage pay off even more than in the industrial age.  Moreover, 
over the last quarter century, the high-paying union jobs that paid a family 
wage to blue-collar men have largely disappeared.137  As a result, the full-
time homemaker role has become perilous, not just because the higher earner 
spouse may choose to end the relationship, but because family well-being 
increasingly depends on two incomes, both to stay afloat in an era of wage 
stagnation and to cushion the impact of layoffs, downturns, and 
underemployment.138  Any remade theory of marriage and alimony therefore 
 
133. See CARBONE, supra note 25, at 63 (noting how, with industrialization, a woman 
“withdrew from family economic production” and focused instead on raising children); NAOMI 
CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL POLARIZATION AND THE 
CREATION OF CULTURE 34–36 (2010) (sketching the implications of industrialization for the 
family). 
134. GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 21–25 (1981). 
135. See CARBONE, supra note 25, at 60–61, 110, 114 (examining Western tendency to delay 
marriage until surprisingly late in life, comparing the advantages of male specialization and female 
specialization in marriage, and pointing out increased investment in childrearing and education by 
the middle class when compared to the working poor). 
136. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 133, at 36–37. 
137. See, e.g., ARNE L. KALLEBERG, GOOD JOBS, BAD JOBS: THE RISE OF POLARIZED AND 
PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1970S TO 2000S, at 103–04, 193 
(2011) (documenting the loss of stable, higher paying blue-collar jobs). 
138. See CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART: THE STATE OF WHITE AMERICA, 1960–2010, at 
175–78 (2012) (documenting changes in working patterns, particularly in white working-class 
communities); ROSIN, supra note 42, at 87–88 (describing women who have been taking over the 
wage-earner roles in the face of layoffs and lower male earnings). 
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must address the issue: is the full-time homemaking role something that any 
spouse should perform or more critically, one that society should encourage? 
A. Norms about Marriage, Norms about Caretaking 
The new model of marriage implicitly rests on the new social script that 
replaces specialized marital roles, including women’s dependence on their 
husbands, with spousal interdependence.  Marriage takes place, within this 
model, between relative equals who enter their unions with established 
earnings and high measures of the trust and flexibility to manage changing 
financial fortunes.139  Starnes’s partnership model is at the core of this new 
script, but the “marital ideal is [one of] interdependence—marriage has 
become an institution that encourages the parties to commingle their assets, 
share responsibility and decision-making, and create intertwined lives.”140  
Within this structure, spouses assume joint responsibility—for the family’s 
finances and for any resulting children.  To vindicate the balancing act at the 
cores of these marriages, however, the new model “expects both spouses to 
retain their capacity for financial independence” in order to meet family 
exigencies and to prepare themselves for a possible split.141  After all, within 
the new regime, both men and women are deemed capable of workforce 
participation, and with the average family now below the replacement level 
of two children per family,142 child care no longer occupies an entire adult 
lifetime. 
Within this model, of course, caretaking still occurs and is still difficult 
to reconcile with the workplace demands of the “ideal worker” employers 
prefer.143  Yet, the patterns that describe modern caretaking do not necessarily 
strengthen the justification for alimony. 
First, the circumstances that best fit the Starnesian model are those of 
the elite.  Yet, the elite are least likely to support assumption of the 
homemaking role as a matter of principle.  For example, Charles Murray 
reported that the General Social Survey asked whether “‘it is much better for 
everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman 
takes care of the home and family’” and that in 1980, the vast majority 
(approximately 70 percent) of low-income whites agreed.144  By 2010, 
however, their support for the traditional model had fallen in half, with 
around 35 percent still responding in the affirmative.145  In contrast, only 
 
139. CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 15, at 90–91. 
140. Id. at 113–14. 
141. Id. 
142. As U.S. Birth Rate Drops, Concern for the Future Mounts, USA TODAY, Feb. 13, 2013, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/02/12/us-births-decline/1880231/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/NUZ9-58RT. 
143. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
144. MURRAY, supra note 138, at 150, 151 & fig.8.1 
145. Id. at 151 fig.8.1. 
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about half of higher income whites agreed with the statement in 1980, and by 
2010, their support for the statement had fallen to less than 20 percent.146  
African-Americans are even less likely than whites to support such a 
traditional division of family labor.147  This leads to a dilemma: the group 
where men are most likely to out earn women and where divorce is most 
likely to involve a primary earner with sufficient income to support a primary 
caretaker is also the group least likely to approve such a division of labor in 
principle. 
Second, even if there were more popular support for the traditional 
caretaking role, it’s not clear that it should receive support as a matter of 
public policy.  The long-term economic changes suggest that investment in 
men and women’s labor-force participation has become increasingly 
important, and the full-time homemaker role can no longer be justified.148 
Among elite workers, however, women are still more likely than men to 
assume that role because of the particular nature of elite competition.  The 
top executive and financial-sector jobs have shown the greatest income 
growth since 1990, fueling income inequality.149  These positions in turn have 
placed greater emphasis on hours worked, routinely exceeding forty hours a 
week, than have other highly skilled occupations.150  The result is not just that 
women have lost ground financially in this top group, though that has 
happened.151  It also has made it very hard for two professionals in high-
 
146. Id.at 151 & fig.8.1. 
147. STARNES, supra note 3, at 28. 
148. Moreover, the caretakers themselves have reservations.  Judith Warner, The Opt-Out 
Generation Wants Back In, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/11/maga 
zine/the-opt-out-generation-wants-back-in.html?pagewanted=all, archived at http://perma.cc/PA 
R3-WSWZ.  As Judith Warner summarizes: 
Many of the women I spoke with were troubled by the gender-role traditionalism that 
crept into their marriages once they gave up work, transforming them from being their 
husbands’ intellectual equals into the one member of their partnership uniquely 
endowed with gifts for laundry or cooking and cleaning; a junior member of the 
household, who sometimes had to “negotiate” with her husband to get money for child 
care. 
Id. 
149. LAWRENCE MISHEL & NATALIE SABADISH, ECON. POLICY INST., CEO PAY AND THE TOP 
1%: HOW EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND FINANCIAL-SECTOR PAY HAVE FUELED INCOME 
INEQUALITY 1–2 (2012), available at http://s4.epi.org/files/2012/ib331-ceo-pay-top-1-percent.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/4B5L-TD9N. 
150. See Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The Cost of Workplace Flexibility for High-
Powered Professionals, 638 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 45, 56–57 (2011) (noting 
business occupations penalize employees for deviating from normal work arrangements to a further 
extent than other high-paid positions). 
151. Indeed, for college graduates as a group, the gendered wage gap has grown during this 
period in large part because of this phenomenon.  See THOMAS D. SNYDER & SALLY A. DILLOW, 
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, NCES 2014-015, DIGEST OF 
EDUCATION STATISTICS 2012, at 633 tbl.438 (2012), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pub 
sinfo.asp?pubid=2014015, archived at http://perma.cc/7KW7-XLNT (showing an increasing gap in 
median annual earnings between college-educated men and women from 1990 to 2011).  See 
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powered jobs, with both facing pressure to work long hours, to stay in the 
labor market on a full-time basis after the birth of children.  This leads to a 
reinforcing cycle: the most lucrative positions are male dominated and place 
the greatest emphasis on long hours; the emphasis on hours discourages many 
women from seeking such careers, reinforcing male domination, and the fact 
that men are more likely than their wives to be in such positions justifies a 
gendered division of family responsibilities.152  These patterns have 
resurrected neotraditional marriages for a subgroup of the most elite families, 
even as such arrangements have been disappearing from other parts of the 
economy, including the majority of college-graduate marriages.153 
These families—the highest earners with a neotraditional division of 
family responsibilities—present the best case for Starnes-style alimony.  
Where there is a significant difference in income between the two spouses, 
the higher earner can afford to pay spousal support and still afford another 
household, the higher earners’ income is likely to reflect the ability to be an 
ideal worker at least in part because of the other spouse’s contributions,154 
 
generally Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The US Gender Pay Gap in the 1990s: Slowing 
Convergence (Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations Section, Working Paper No. 508, 2006), available 
at http://www.irs.princeton.edu/pubs/pdfs/508.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9ZPY-25YG 
(studying “the slowdown in the convergence of female and male wages in the 1990s compared to 
the 1980s”). 
152. Goldin & Katz, supra note 150, at 57–58. 
153. Indeed, college-educated women generally enjoy more family-friendly workplaces than 
other women and are less likely to cut back on their hours after the birth of children than lower 
earning women.  See LYNDA LAUGHLIN, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
MATERNITY LEAVE AND EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS OF FIRST-TIME MOTHERS: 1961–2008, at 16 
(2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p70-128.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/FS65-UUCS (noting that women with bachelor’s degrees were more likely to return 
to working full-time after the birth of their child than women with positions requiring less 
education); Christine R. Schwartz, Earnings Inequality and the Changing Association Between 
Spouses’ Earnings, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1524, 1526 (2010) (stating that high-earning women have 
become more likely to stay in the labor market).  As the text notes, when the price of high income 
is long hours and little family flexibility, however, the women are more likely than the men to cut 
back on work-force participation.  See Goldin & Katz, supra note 150, at 57–58 (describing how 
career interruptions negatively affect gender gap in earnings).  Indeed, it turns out that women who 
graduated from elite universities are more likely than other women to opt out.  Joni Hersh, Opting 
Out Among Women with Elite Education 4–5 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law and Econ., Research 
Paper No. 13-05, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2221482, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/E2RR-X2UZ.  Upper middle class couples therefore are both more likely to be in 
successful dual-earner arrangements and to display neotraditional family patterns.  See PAUL R. 
AMATO ET AL., supra note 124, at 137–38 (suggesting that middle-class couples where both parties 
are career-oriented and earn relatively high incomes are insulated from job-related stress and 
economic insecurity and positing that evasion of economic problems arising from the wife’s 
employment benefits the marriage). 
154. Ironically, however, really high earners are likely to have had similar opportunities without 
spousal contributions.  What they could not have, however, are children (or at least not children 
raised the same way) and the same jobs. 
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and the lower earning spouse is likely to have made substantial sacrifices in 
income capacity because of the marriage.155 
These arrangements, however, also tend to reflect the parts of the 
economy with the least family flexibility and the greatest discrimination 
against women.  While we agree that alimony is appropriate in these cases, 
we have considerable reservations about treating these atypical cases as 
prominent ones either for establishing marital norms or for setting standards 
that would apply to other families. 
B. Alimony and Class 
The world that idealizes homemakers is a world that needs alimony.  
Yet, the vast majority of households need two incomes, and even if one 
spouse temporarily scales back, the complete dependence of the full-time 
homemaker role is a luxury few families can afford.  Instead, men and women 
cycle in and out of the labor market because of increasing employment 
instability, the inflexibility of many non-elite workplaces, and the high cost 
of child care.156  These arrangements do not rest on the same foundation as 
elite marriages.  There is often no gain to the higher earner, the lower earner’s 
low income is less likely to be a product of decisions made during the 
marriage, and the family’s child-care arrangements are more likely to reflect 
an absence of choices rather than conscious sharing decisions made over the 
course of the marriage. 
In 1970, 40% of all mothers with children under the age of 18 were stay-
at-home mothers with working husbands; in 2012, that number had fallen by 
half, and among lower earners, gender does not play the same role in the 
distribution of family income.157  In a growing number of households, men 
and women are equal earners—or women earn more.  Almost 70% of women 
in the bottom quintile of earnings (family earnings up to $28,894/year)158 
 
155. Carbone, supra note 23, at 77 (“The majority of marriages produce children, and childcare 
almost always entails some sacrifice of career opportunities that extends beyond the end of the 
marriage.”). 
156. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.  See generally JOAN C. WILLIAMS & 
HEATHER BOUSHEY, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE THREE FACES OF WORK-FAMILY CONFLICT: 
THE POOR, THE PROFESSIONALS, AND THE MISSING MIDDLE (2010), available at http://www 
.worklifelaw.org/pubs/ThreeFacesofWork-FamilyConflict.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/73F9-
58NR (cataloguing the myriad challenges faced by parents in non-professional positions). 
157. D’VERA COHN ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., AFTER DECADES OF DECLINE, A RISE IN 
STAY-AT-HOME MOTHERS 8 fig. (2014), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2014 
/04/Moms-At-Home_04-08-2014.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EX7R-3HB6. 
158. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, TABLE F-1. INCOME LIMITS FOR EACH 
FIFTH AND TOP 5 PERCENT OF FAMILIES (ALL RACES): 1947 TO 2012, http://www.census.gov 
/hhes/www/income/data/historical/families/2013/f01AR.xls, archived at http://perma.cc/8Y5E-
82AW. 
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have the same income, or a higher one, than their husbands.159  In the top 
quintile, that is true of approximately one-third of women, albeit a number 
that has almost tripled since 1967.160 
Indeed, when we look at women who drop out of the workforce, this is 
most likely to happen at the bottom of family incomes.  These women, who 
are much less likely to be married in any event, are much less likely to do so 
in ways that contribute to a partner’s earning capacity.  Instead, their choices 
reflect the difficulties they experience combining employment and child-care 
responsibilities.161  Almost half of stay-at-home mothers have no education 
beyond high school (in contrast with women with a bachelor’s degree, who 
are more likely to be working than any other group of women).162 
Increasingly, the story of divorce, which has fallen for the top group and 
risen for everyone else, is a story of adjustment to an increasingly unstable 
employment market.  Paul Amato and his colleagues show that among the 
elite, the marriage quality of dual earners has increased while their divorce 
proneness has fallen.163  For those who don’t graduate from college, however, 
wives’ workforce participation tends to reflect their husbands’ lack of income 
and greater marital tensions.164  Hanna Rosin in The End of Men presents a 
portrait of women who, in the face of plant closings and economic downturns, 
step up to the plate.  They take on jobs, invest in careers, receive promotions 
at work—and still assume the primary responsibility for the house and the 
children.165  These women, who are much more likely than the elite to 
divorce, would in a Starnesian world also face increasing claims for alimony 
 
159. SARAH JANE GLYNN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE NEW BREADWINNERS: 2010 
UPDATE, 3 fig. 2 (2012), http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/04/pdf 
/breadwinners.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4WLX-92DM. 
160. Id.  On an aggregate level, women are the primary breadwinners in almost one quarter of 
all marriages.  Philip N. Cohen, For Married Mothers, Breadsharing Is Far More Common than 
Breadwinning, FAM. INEQUALITY (June 3, 2013, 2:29 PM), http://familyinequality.wordpress 
.com/2013/06/03/breadsharer-breadwinner/, archived at http://perma.cc/5S9H-GGHJ.  Cohen notes 
that women in these families earn smaller shares of the overall household earnings than do men who 
are the primary earners in their households, so the number is somewhat distorting.  Id.  Nonetheless, 
even when a woman earns only $1 more, it indicates the movement towards equality in partners’ 
earnings. 
161. See WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 123, at 130–31 (noting that in at least one study, 
most of the women involved in the study attempted to adjust their work responsibilities to 
accommodate their family responsibilities prior to leaving the labor force). 
162. COHN ET AL., supra note 157, at 7, 19. 
163. See AMATO ET AL., supra note 124, at 137–38 (suggesting that middle-class couples where 
both parties are career oriented and earn relatively high incomes are insulated from job-related stress 
and economic insecurity and positing that evasion of economic problems arising from the wife’s 
employment benefits the marriage). 
164. Id. at 123–24. 
165. See generally ROSIN, supra note 42, at 79–112 (explaining the rise of women in the “New 
American Matriarchy,” in which women increasingly outperform men as the primary provider, 
earner, and caregiver in the face of rising male unemployment and erosion of patriarchal family 
structures). 
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from the slacker dudes whom they are leaving behind.  While there is not 
enough income in most of these families to produce much in the way of 
alimony payments, the principle—that the higher earning spouse who trained 
for a new job, won promotions, cleaned out the refrigerator, and supervised 
the children’s homework is responsible for the spouse playing video games—
does not sit terribly well in a new egalitarian era.  The predictable result, 
already well underway, is even less marriage. 
What Starnes’s concept of alimony fails to acknowledge or shape is the 
implicit terms of the new lower and working-class relationships—unless 
Starnes is ready to conclude that such couples should not marry at all and that 
the class-based division in marriage rates is an appropriate one. 
Conclusion 
Family has long been tied to dependency—the reliance of women on 
their husbands’ income and the importance of marriage in providing for 
children and their caretakers.166  The rise of more autonomous women, who 
can thrive on their own earnings, and the decline of marriage—both as the 
institution for organizing sex and as the exclusive way to provide for 
children—have rocked family law to its core.  In an era in which pundits 
proclaim “The End of Men”167 or “The Richer Sex”168 and others believe that 
all able-bodied adults should be in the labor market,169 no agreement exists 
on a justification for alimony, and many call for its abolition.170  Starnes has 
made a compelling attempt to provide just such a justification for alimony.  
Accepting her argument, however, means agreeing that marriage is an 
enduring commitment that is not ended by divorce and accepting that one 
spouse will take primary responsibility for caretaking while the other invests 
in developing a more stable income stream.  At the end of the day, the 
question is not whether alimony can be justified on the basis of partnership 
principles because the idea of the interdependent union at the core of 
marriage is a compelling one.  Instead, the questions concern the future of 
caretaking and the role of marriage in an increasingly class-based society. 
The book, reduced to its essentials, still works for the new patriarchy—
the group where the men have a higher income potential, where his earnings 
are greater than hers for gendered reasons, and she stays home for similarly 
 
166. For a discussion of the relationship between autonomy and vulnerability, see generally 
Martha Albertson Fineman, Essay, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human 
Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008). 
167. ROSIN, supra note 42. 
168. LIZA MUNDY, THE RICHER SEX (2012). 
169. Indeed, a major shift is that both men and women have become wary of potential partners 
who wish to be supported.  CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 15, at 119. 
170. Keli Goff, Is Alimony Anti-Feminist?, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.the 
dailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/25/is-alimony-anti-feminist.html, archived at http://perma.cc/582-
NEHQ. 
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gendered ones.  The problem is those assumptions are no longer universal, 
and a theory of alimony must tease out when this makes sense and when it 
doesn’t.  While the case can be made that the Caseys of the world, together 
with the spouses of CEOs and investment bankers, should receive alimony at 
divorce, we do not wish to cede to these atypical couples the power to define 
the terms of marriage for everyone else. 
